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This paper, structured in four parts, analyses the recent changes that have taken place in ChinaMyanmar relations owing to Naypyidaw's political transition, and assesses Beijing's responses to new challenges in bilateral ties. Following this introduction reviewing the impact of the post-2011 reforms in Myanmar on bilateral ties, the article then evaluates the policy adjustments by the Chinese government to address criticisms regarding its putative neo-colonialist ambitions; the apparent lack of corporate social responsibility policies and practices by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs); and the much-maligned environmental costs borne by the host country as a result of China's economic activism. The discussion then focuses on how Beijing can further recalibrate its policy with Naypyidaw to pre-empt and mitigate policy complications that can harm Chinese strategic and economic interests in its Southeast Asian neighbour. The final section provides concluding remarks.
Although China's interests in Myanmar have primarily been economically driven by its desire to secure natural resources, 7 signs are pointing to a change in Beijing's approach in view of the negative publicity generated from popular local opposition towards Chinese economic activities -which run counter to China's strategic interest in depicting itself as a benign rising power. Beijing's decision to recalibrate its Myanmar policy is thus timely and significant. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen if
Beijing can thoroughly address the deterioration in the traditional fraternal Pauk Phaw bilateral relationship with Naypyidaw. 
Political Transition in Myanmar and its Impact on Bilateral Relations
During the visit of Myanmar's then head-of-state and most senior junta leader, Than Shwe, to China in September 2010, former Chinese President Hu Jintao had pointed out that China-Myanmar relations have withstood the test of an ever-changing world since diplomatic relations were established.
Reaffirming the two as having -forged Pauk Phaw friendship‖ and describing ties as -an example for friendly relations between countries with different social systems‖, 10 the two former leaders further reiterated their desire to carry forward their partnership. 11 In light of the new quasi-civilian government's decision to suspend construction of the Myitsone Dam a year later, both the international and Chinese media, in addition to members of the global academic fraternity, commenced to call on Beijing to review its extant Myanmar policy; 12 some of them going so far as to describe China as having -lost‖ Myanmar. 36 Based on Myanmar media reports and the first author's interviews with relevant personnel, Beijing's offer of an estimated US$ 4.8 billion worth of financial assistance -that was later converted to concessionary loanshad apparently been snubbed by Myanmar's government as the latter shifted its attention towards receiving overseas development aid from Tokyo and other Western donors. Even though Naypyidaw had given approval for the use of the Chinese loan, no concrete parliamentary motion was passed with regards to its utilisation. Further, following Myanmar's political transition, the acquisition and amount of international loans, as well as the sectors in which they are to be subsequently disbursed to, have all become regulated. 46 Following the reproduction of the Financial Times article -Myanmar's old friend China is left wondering where it went wrong‖ in mainstream Chinese media, the authors noted of a deluge of commentaries on a number of online websites and bulletin boards which prompted soul-searching within China's academic and business communities to identify the factors that had led to China ‗losing' Myanmar. 47 Apparently, Beijing had assumed that the transformation of the Myanmese state into a civilian government was nothing more than the junta's tactic to legitimise its rule, -with no clear intention to give up power‖. Sun, -China's Strategic Misjudgment,‖ 90.
48 Having previously underestimated the U.S.' engagement with Myanmar while overestimating its own political influence over Naypyidaw, China has since had to contend with -Myanmar's rapidly improving relations with the West‖ -which includes Britain, Australia and the EU, all of whom have since sought -closer engagement‖ with it. See Thuzar -Engaging Two Giants,‖.92. 49 The first author's interviews with a cross-section of Myanmar nationals -including (but not exclusive to) senior government officials, retired diplomats, academics and exiled activists -at an international conference discussing changes in China-Myanmar bilateral relations at the City University of Hong Kong (CUHK) in 2012. 50 One of nine advisors to the Thein Sein administration, Nay Zin Latt, has pointed out that instead of distancing itself from any one of the major powers, Naypyidaw would rather -leverage relations‖ with Beijing, Delhi, as well as Washington to -benefit the country‖. During the period of Myanmar's military rule, it was also mandatory for locals to seek official approval before they could meet with foreign citizens, after which they were required to submit a report detailing the proceedings. providing social assistance to disadvantaged social classes and diverse non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the areas of healthcare and education. 66 More recently, Chinese officialdom has even extended its outreach to the 88 Generation Students Group -Myanmar's famed civil society entity that was brutally oppressed by the junta during the 1988 pro-democracy protests 67 -to take on-board its members' suggestions on how Chinese investors could better manage their investments in Myanmar.
Third, Chinese officials have also facilitated joint consultations with their Burmese counterparts as well as members of civil society groups, business and academic communities to discuss China's experiences with its own economic reforms. In May 2013 for instance, the first ever China-Myanmar non-governmental roundtable was organised between relevant Chinese and Burmese organisations with the aim of jointly promoting mutually beneficial development. 68 In addition to learning about the concerns of civil society groups, this first round of talks also facilitated non-governmental exchanges between Beijing and Naypyidaw as well as benefitted from contributions from officials of both countries. 69 Additionally, in-depth discussions on how the two sides could cooperate in other areas of common interests were also shared. 75 A comprehensive list of CNPC's contributions to Myanmese society found in one of its press releases includes -protecting the interests of local people‖, -supporting infrastructure construction‖, financing and refurbishing local hospitals and schools‖, -focusing on environmental protection‖, -providing employee training and creating jobs‖, -helping disaster-affected areas‖ as well as -taking care of the underprivileged and participating in charity activities‖. See -Caring for communities along the Myanmar-China Oil and Gas Pipelines,‖ CNPC, accessed March 10, 2015, http://www.cnpc.com.cn/en/CaringforcommunitiesalongtheMyanmarChinaOilGasPipelines/Caringforcommunit iesalongtheMyanmarChinaOilGasPipelines.shtml. Rather remarkably, the information on the website also claims that the pipelines were rerouted -whenever the land conversion scheme [was] declined by local residents or wherever a stupa, temple, school, graveyard or wildlife reserve [stood] on the route‖. Its construction work has apparently caused neither -environmental pollution‖ nor -ecological damage‖.
in the community, building several schools, linking villages to the national electric grid as well as compensating displaced villagers. 76 In a -highly unusual‖ move, the company also revised its contract with other signatories to reduce its own share of profits. While Chinese companies' revision of their Myanmar strategy appears to have gained some ground in winning over some members of the Burmese public, 77 it is still unclear whether Beijing has the capacity -and the will -to impose such socially desirable behaviour among Chinese corporations operating outside of China through the use of -stricter guidelines, regulations and enforcement‖. 79 According to the last official census, the Burman majority group accounted for up to 69% of the population whereas the sizeable ethnic minority communities -comprising of the Shan (9%), Karen (7%), Rakhine (3.5%), Chin (2.5%), Mon (2%), Kachin (1.5%), Karenni (0.75%), Wa (0.16%) and Rohingya (0.15%) -make up the remaining one-third of the country's inhabitants. See -Briefing: Myanmar's ethnic problems‖, Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), March 29, 2012, accessed March 10, 2015, http://www.irinnews.org/report/95195/briefing-myanmar-s-ethnic-problems. 80 Ibid. How best to manage the distribution of power and resources in a manner that is both acceptable to each ethnic group -without any the latter sacrificing their individual identities, customs and cultures -has also led to it being referred to as -a crisis of the minorities‖ by some scholars; see for example, Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar, 12.
81 In return for promises of full autonomy in internal administration and an equal share in the country's wealth in the post-colonial period, a number of the main ethnic groups signed up to the Panglong Agreement of 1947 initiated by their former British colonial masters. The ill-improvised and inconsistent compromises between the centre and the various minority groups meant that, however, the proposed provisions of inclusiveness and fairness were never implemented in a manner acceptable to all the signatories -leading to the beginning of several ethnic insurrections, some of which have continued to this day. See prepare themselves for military conflict with government forces. 82 Driven by its desire for stability along its borders with Myanmar, China had nevertheless responded cautiously towards Myanmar's internal ethnic tensions. Having previously been caught off-guard by the refugee crisis following Naypyidaw's attacks on the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA Shan State-North, Special Region-1) in the Kokang conflict, Beijing is no longer under any illusion that it could use the armed ethnic groups as -buffers that provided strategic leverage over Naypyidaw‖, 83 and hence shifted its position from maintaining the status quo towards promoting national reconciliation. Such a policy shift has also convinced Myanmar that China -will not obstruct it in solving the issue of the ethnic groups‖. 84 While China has succeeded in mediating between Naypyidaw and the UWSA, 85 Chinese appeals for reconciliation between the state government and the KIA fell on deaf ears when hostilities resumed in June 2011. 86 Following the escalation of conflict between the state military and the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) in late 2012 around Laiza, China began to step up its efforts in demanding an end to such skirmishes, as well as called on both sides to implement a cease-fire. 87 Before long, following high-level meetings between the civilian and military leaderships of both countries, 88 hostilities between the Myanmar army and the KIO reached a quick end. 89 In February 2013, the Chinese government also facilitated a meeting between the Burmese government and the KIA in the Chinese city of Ruili, 90 thereby easing tensions and paving the way for further talks. This, altruism, 91 and have even been described as -heavy-handed‖, 92 the small success of the talks has nevertheless been attributed to the positive role played by Beijing.
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As China's national interests have expanded, Beijing's foreign policymakers also appear to be revising Chinese diplomacy with their creative deployment of specially appointed ad hoc envoys as peacemakers. Most representative of the proposition that China should move away from its long-held non-interference policy in the internal affairs of other countries is the concept of "creative involvement"
which espouses a proactive approach through which Beijing can strive for a more substantial role in international affairs. 94 Rather than exerting any outright domination over the elites and people of Myanmar into accepting Chinese directives, China's constructive mediation via its special envoys to northern Myanmar serves as further proof of a subtle -yet substantial -recalibration of its policy.
Recommendations on Refining China's Policy on Myanmar Further
From the above, it is clear that Beijing has become more attuned to the challenges arising from Naypyidaw's political transformation. And more so, given how China cannot expect to remove itself fully from the domestic politics of its neighbour by virtue of its economic footprint in the latter's natural resources markets, and its close political association with Myanmar's civilianised military rulers. The following section proffers the view that although China's policies towards Myanmar may have undergone considerable change as evinced by Beijing's reaching out to the possible candidates of Myanmar's future leadership, 95 any effect from these adjustments will nevertheless require some time 91 Citing the possible internationalisation of the Kachin conflict as -China's grave concern‖, Yun Sun contends that Beijing's motivation to intervene -as opposed to -concern for the ethnic conflict itself‖ -was driven more by its -fear of American presence‖ across its border arising from a possible role for 95 Underneath state-to-state relations, the CCP's International Department has had success in establishing relations with opposition parties and politicians-in-waiting. In Latin America and the Caribbean alone, the CCP organ has developed working relations with more than 100 parties across 31 countries since 2007. See before they can manifest fully. In the period leading up to their realisation, it would be in Beijing's interests to address the underlying issues in its bilateral relations with Naypyidaw by reviewing its evaluation of the trajectory of Myanmar's political reforms.
Concurrently, China can benefit from a holistic recalibration of its relationship with Myanmar. On one hand, China should rethink its policies in deference to the aspirations of actors across Myanmar's political spectrum so that most of the latter may benefit from bilateral cooperation. At the same time,
China also needs to carefully respond to historical grievances and current negative views.
Recalibrations -in thought and in deed -would be essential for ameliorating tensions in ChinaMyanmar ties as well as encouraging stability in bilateral relations. At the same time, this would also serve Chinese interests in mainland Southeast Asia since Beijing can then be expected to be in a stronger position to better articulate its views on vital regional interests to Naypyidaw. 96 From Beijing's perspective, the significance of this is particularly salient amidst the geopolitical uncertainties arising from Washington's rebalance to the region. It follows thus that Beijing will need to harmonise its
Myanmar policy with the relevant provincial authorities, 97 the various CCP and ministerial organs as well as Chinese enterprises -both state-owned and private -in order for projected benefits can be realised. Significantly, any such coordinated formulation and synchronised policy implementation will also have to factor in complementarities between the national interests of both countries, and more importantly, the host country's own development needs. Burmese society -still caught in the euphoria of democratic transition -continue to attribute the country's political stagnation to previous Chinese complicity. Indeed, such popular displays of resentment towards China's role will require time to fully dissipate.
Beijing will also be required to proactively pay due regard to the armed violence between Myanmar's government and the ethnic minorities. A prerequisite would be to proactively acknowledge the various political, economic and socio-cultural needs of the groups inhabiting the border regions in northern Myanmar. While anticipating the multiple short-term stress points resulting from a future national reconciliation is important, Beijing would also need to address the historical baggage of its previous support for some of these minority groups. Therefore, Beijing should, once and for all, make clear its position on Myanmar's ethnic crisis and stave off radical concepts such as -stirring up ethnic tensions‖, 99 or -nurture the Kachin tiger‖, 100 in the false hopes that these would enable it to maintain some political leverage over Naypyidaw. This would also enable China to counter any claims that it is not genuinely committed to Myanmar's democratic transition into a peaceful, unified and developed country. Towards that end, the Chinese leadership and provincial authorities in Yunnan can strengthen their efforts in facilitating peace talks between Myanmar's state government and the ethnic forces in northern Myanmar, and encourage all sides to reach a peace accord sooner, rather than later. China can also present its policy preference for peace and stability in its border regions as serving the interests of all parties involved in view of the socio-economic development that would then be made possible. First of all, China needs to redirect its economic investments in Myanmar towards those sectors that support the people's aspirations for economic development. 101 In order to address Burmese societal concerns regarding China's neo-colonialist ambitions, the next wave of Chinese investment projects in Myanmar should shift away from those sectors that do not promote Myanmar's indigenous development. As such, Chinese firms can move into Myanmar's secondary and tertiary sectors.
Regarding the former, Beijing and Naypyidaw can strengthen bilateral collaboration in the manufacturing industry, with China providing its expertise on developing Myanmar's northern regions into a manufacturing hub to meet domestic demands for agricultural machinery and household appliances. Looking ahead, China can also use its experience in running an export-based economy to assist Myanmar develop its southern region into an export-oriented processing hub. In return for its assistance, Beijing may then claim credit in helping Naypyidaw offset the imbalances in their bilateral trade over the longer term. 102 In view of the fact that Chinese foreign assistance has been growing at a much faster rate than traditional lenders, 103 Beijing can also share its developmental experience and provide leadership in combating poverty by fostering agricultural development, building the host country's capacity for providing public goods, as well as provide infrastructure construction and disaster relief to win local hearts and minds. Using agricultural development as an example, China-Myanmar economic cooperation can shift away from the building of dams and mining activities to the joint development of agricultural cooperation zones in Myanmar. One possible site could be none other than Naypyidaw so that the endeavour would be more accessible for local government officials in order that study trips to the site can be facilitated more regularly. Similarly, other zones could be situated near the border areas between China and Myanmar so that the harvesting, processing and sales of future produce can be integrated, and consequently be either sold to Burmese and Chinese markets, or exported to other countries further afield. At the same time, Beijing can set up a cooperative platform with Naypyidaw to assist Burmese authorities in the adoption of state-of-the-art farming practices. Through While having the intent to work towards a mutually beneficial relationship is significant, knowing how to achieve such a desired outcome would be equally crucial. While Chinese officials and businessmen had previously declared that enriching the Burmese people is of greater importance than reaping the benefits from their investments, the fact remains that many large-scale projects in Myanmar have, to a great extent, been driven by Chinese self-interests. 105 In order to mitigate any future negative local perception and media coverage of their country's economic activities in Myanmar, Chinese officials and businessmen should therefore take into consideration Myanmar's long-term development, as well as make provisions for the needs of locals, in their search for suitable sectors to invest in. To achieve this, Beijing may like to take a leaf out of the Singapore government's book by customising its engagements according to Naypyidaw's requirements 106 -rather than take for granted that whatever economic assistance it renders to its less well-to-do neighbour is reciprocated by all segments of the Myanmar's opposition, there have unsurprisingly been suggestions that the latter should tread carefully for want of being associated with Beijing. 107 Chinese policymakers, while having recognised how Chinese economic ties influence the politics of Myanmar's liberalisation, will also need to consider measures to dampen the fallout from attempts at using perceptions of China for political partisanship.
To address this issue, Chinese diplomacy ought to be conducted in accordance with Chinese President Xi Jinping's dictum of -amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness‖ with China's neighbouring countries.
responsible behaviour. 109 Chinese companies, in particular, can also help to minimise negative social effects associated with having numerous Chinese personnel operating in local undertakings.
Following popular protests against projects such as the Myitsone Dam, Beijing will also need to engage Myanmar's ruling elite and its public to prevent anti-China sentiments from fomenting further.
Such measures will enable China and Myanmar to come to a consensus on the final resolution to the problematic Myitsone impasse before the situation worsens. China can also learn from other countries that have provided assistance to Myanmar and work towards boosting the impact of its own foreign economic aid. As a demonstration of its commitment to the country's national development, Beijing can reform its aid mechanism to Naypyidaw in a manner akin to Tokyo's official development assistance (ODA), and disburse its resources in the form of economic and humanitarian assistance in support of Myanmar's less privileged social classes, as well as less developed regions and sectors.
Conclusion
Myanmar's strategic status in China's regional diplomacy used to serve as a paragon of friendship and cooperation in the foreign relations of both countries. After a close-knit relationship that lasted as is the case with Myanmar, China has learned that it would have to take into account the concerns of the nation's multifarious interest groups in addition to ensuring that the so-called mutual benefits derived from their economic cooperation extend to the grassroots level. As Beijing grows accustomed to widespread opposition towards its projects in Myanmar, it has also become more attuned to popular sentiments regarding firstly, its role in propping up the former military regime, and secondly, local economic frustration vented in its direction -rather than against Myanmar's rulers.
While there can be no one-size-fits-all approach in managing the current tensions in bilateral relations, any future success in addressing the challenges associated with Myanmar's political transition will also demand that Beijing constantly revisit its policies. Although it may still be too early to judge the effectiveness of China's policy recalibration heretofore, it is clear that both Chinese officialdom and enterprises have adjusted their policies and practices to broaden their political and economic engagements in Myanmar. In its leading role, the central government has directed its Myanmar-based diplomats to connect with the local populace in a bid to bolster China's image, and also encouraged Chinese corporations to observe local customs as well as extend their community outreach programmes to the provision of education and healthcare services. These policy corrections are of significance to Beijing's handling of its relationship with its neighbour, and also serve as a valuable point of reference for Chinese foreign relations with countries in the developing world. In 109 Following the Myanmar government's proposals to transform Kyaukpyu into a special economic zone, China's CNPC claimed that it had spent more than US$10 million to construct -local schools, hospitals and infrastructure including a reservoir and drinking water facilities‖ for the island's inhabitants. See Robinson, -Myanmar plans its own ‗mini Singapore'.‖ spite of China's attempts to reach out to a wider section of Burmese society, a return to the Pauk Phaw fraternal relationship that previously served as a highlight in China-Myanmar relations, however, appears inconceivable in the near future.
Notwithstanding the purposeful attempts at re-evaluating its diplomacy, whether the policies already in place -as well as those that are in the process of being implemented -eventually succeed, may be 
